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Abstract
The current and future funding of elderly care is an important issue for national budgets.
The demand for care will increase vastly due to the ageing population. At the same
time, the number of informal caregivers comprising mainly family members and friends
is decreasing because of the demographic transition, the de-familiarization process and
increased labor force participation of women. Governments are trying to find the best
strategy to balance the provision of care between state, market, and relatives. There
is however no consensus about the effects of informal care on labor market related out-
comes. In this thesis, the effect of informal parental care on the labor force participation
of caregivers in Norway, Sweden and Denmark is analyzed, using data from a longitudinal
internet-based survey conducted in 2010. Caregiving is instrumented by variables related
to the health status of the parents. Thereby the potential endogeneity existing between
informal care and employment is controlled for. Informal parental care is generally found
to be unrelated to employment. However, intensive informal parental caregivers, implying
caregivers providing at least 30 hours of care per month, have a significant lower probabil-
ity of being employed. There are no gender or country differences in this effect. Further,
exogeneity cannot be rejected in the relationship between parental care and employment.
This thesis suggests that the Nordic countries can be grouped together in informal care-
related issues and that small amounts of informal care could be promoted to relax the
national budget.
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1 Introduction
The ageing of the population is one of the biggest challenges in European countries (Euro-
stat, 2000). In the Nordic countries (i.e., Norway, sweden, and Denmark), life expectancy
has risen significantly in recent decades - from around 72 years in 1975 to around 80 years
in 2010. Together with declining mortality rates and decreasing birth rates (SSB, SCB,
and DST, 2012), the fraction of elderly in the population has increased while the number
of possible caregivers in the family has declined. As these trends are expected to continue,
the proportion and number of elderly, and consequently care recipients, will raise even
further. For example, according to projections by the Economic Policy Committee (2011),
the number of people aged 65 and over in EU 15 will raise from 61 million (16.1 percent
of the total population) in 2000 to 103 million (27.5 percent) in 2050. Those aged 80 and
over are projected to increase from almost 14 million (3.6 percent) in 2000 to some 38
million (10 percent) in 2050.
One important aspect of the demographic transition will therefore be the increasing need
for elderly care. Care can be provided formally by paid workers or informally by family
members, friends, or voluntary organizations. (For a detailed definition of care, see Chap-
ter 2). For the case of the elderly, the OECD estimates that around 80% of all hours of
care are provided informally (OECD, 2011). However, the socioeconomic trend of indi-
vidualization together with declining birth rates in the Nordic countries are expected to
reduce the fraction of family members being caregivers.
The two main forms of care are home care and institutional care. Institutional care is
considered to be the most expensive form of care, while formal or informal home care
is not only cheaper but is also regarded to fit the preferences of the elderly better (Si-
monazzi, 2009). Although informal care does not have a lot of direct financial costs, the
opportunity cost from forgone earnings or leisure may be large (Byrne et al., 2008). Work
responsibilities may be incompatible with care responsibilities (Johnson and Sasso, 2000).
This may especially be the case for women, who are the main informal caregivers and
who have increased their labor force participation over the last decades (SSB, SCB, and
DST, 2012). The effect of caregiving on labor force participation could differ significantly
between genders. This must be taken into account when formulating elder care policies.
If women face stronger effects of caregiving on their labor force particiaption, the goal
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of balanced labor force participation across all ages will not be achieved. Since women
generally are the main caregivers, they face changing demand sequences during their life
(giving care to children, elderly, etc.; Moretensen et al., 2004). There are additional con-
cerns about having a large enough tax base to support the needs of retired citizens (e.g.,
Karoly and Panis, 2004; Spillman and Pezzin, 2000; Toossi, 2006). The expected increase
in demand for elderly care (e.g., Yang et al., 2003; Wise, 2005; Hancock et al., 2003) will
put additional pressure on the performance and funding of care (OECD, 2005).
The increasing need for elderly care is a common phenomenon in all European countries.
However, there are large differences in terms of of public policies aimed to deal with
this issue (Crespo, 2006). Governments are striving to find the best way to balance
the provision of care between the government, the market and the family (Bettio and
Plantenga, 2004). In order to develop good strategies in this respect, it is crucial to
know how informal care impacts the lives of the caregivers and the ones being cared
for (Carmichael and Charles, 2003a). The decisions of whether to participate in the
labor market and whether to care for one’s parents are interrelated for individuals with
parents in need of care (Ettner, 1996; Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Bolin et al., 2007).
Since the ones caring for their parents are typically around age fifty and therefore still of
working age, provision of care may imply large opportunity costs (Johnson and Wiener,
2007). In addition, formal care may not be available, limiting the decision for informal
caregivers (Spiess and Schneider, 2003). Cross country differences in provision of formal
care are partly due to institutional differences in the labor market and with respect to
care institutions. The different conditions influencing the labor market and care regimes,
e.g., flexible working hours and the extent of public provision of elderly (Simonazzi, 2009)
are shown in Figure 1.
For an ideal policy recommendation, all effects of elderly care in relation to employment
must be taken into account (Bolin et al., 2008). This thesis will focus on one particular
topic: The effect of informal parental care on labor force participation. Few studies have
compared European countries in this respect, this shortage has been attributed ”differ-
ences in institutional and legal frameworks, conceptual difficulties and lack of comparable
data” (Bettio and Plantenga, 2004, page 86). European studies focusing on the effect
of elderly care on employment are in particular still scarce (Moretensen at al., 2004).
This thesis concentrates on the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. These
2
Labor 
market 
Care 
regimes 
Care decision 
market 
wage 
employment 
opportunities 
Flexible working 
time arrangements 
Other measures 
aimed at 
reconciling care 
giving and wage 
earnings 
Public care provision Flexible and 
affordable market 
care 
Different weight 
of formal and 
informal 
caregivers 
Monetary and 
non-monetary 
schemes aimed at 
supporting 
informal 
caregiving 
Figure 1: Opportunity cost of family caregivers and the cost of paid care; Simonazzi, 2009)
countries are considered to have similar elder care institutions (e.g., Anttonen and Sipila,
1996).
This thesis finds that parental caregiving generally has no significant negative effect on
employment. Those who provide intensive care to their parents are, however, significantly
less likely to be employed. No statistically significant country or gender differences were
found in this respect. No endogeneity problem was found in the relationship between
parental care and employment in Norway, Sweden and Denmark.
In the following, I will first give an empirical overview of gender effects of informal care
on labor force participation in European countries and the US. Then the elderly care
systems in Europe and the Nordic countries will be presented with a strong focus on
differences between the Nordic countries. Afterwards I will introduce the theoretical
background of the possible trade-off between employment and informal care. Based on a
detailed description of the data, the effects of being a caregiver on the probability of being
employed can be estimated with a probit regression. Further, the possible endogeneity
problem will be adressed using an instrumental variable approach. Comparing the country
results, I identify differences and similarities, which I then discuss on the background of
the countrie’s different care systems. I will then end my thesis with a discussion concerning
the results and policy implications, and finally conclusions.
3
2 Definitions
Throughout this thesis I will use the definition of formal and informal care by Bettio and
Plantenga (2004, p.86): ”informal care refers to all unregulated, mostly unpaid, activities
on behalf of children, elderly relatives, or others. Formal provisions of care can be defined
as provisions regulated by law or other contractual arrangement.” Care can be financed
either by the public or privately. According to the four sectors of the “welfare diamond,”
the responsibilities to care are divided between: the family and informal care sector; the
state or public sector; the voluntary and non-governmental sector; the care market or the
private sector (Krevers et al., 2006). The different tasks of informal family care can be
categorized into three groups: personal care with routine daily living activities; household
work and emotional support; and administrative help (Triantafillou et al., 2010). I will
use a broad definition of care that include all three groups.
Regarding labor foce participation, there is a distinction between the extensive and in-
tensive margin of labor supply. The effect of care giving on labor market outcomes can
be investigated by looking at whether caregivers are less likely to be employed because
they quit their work temporarily or retired early. This is the extensive margin. The in-
tensive margin, on the otherhand investigates whether caregivers reduce their work hours,
take on fewer responsibilities, or forgo promotions in order to meet their care demands
(Carmichael and Charles, 2003). It is important to look at both margins since caring
could influence both current earnings and future retirement income, which implies conse-
quences also after the period of care giving (Van Houtven, 2013). Since the information
in the dataset only provides only information on current work status, this thesis focuses
on the extensive margin.
3 Literature review
Lilly et al. (2007) evaluate the international research on informal caregivers from 1986
to 2006, and conclude that intensive caregivers, but not caregivers in general tend to be
less likely to be employed. Additionally care givers are more likely to work less hours
than non-caregivers. While there are a number of studies on informal care in the US and
the UK, there are still few studies on the rest of Europe, including the Nordic countries
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(e.g., Johnson and Lo Sasso, 2000; Heitmueller and Michaud, 2006; Lilly et al., 2007 and
Casado et al., 2011). The results on the impact of informal caregiving on labor supply
are mixed. The estimates range from large negative and statistically significant effects
to no significant effects at all. Besides the fact that the data samples refer to different
countries, this may be because the different studies use different definitions of the care
indicators or different cutoffs for intensive care (Crespo and Mira, 2010).
Focusing on the evidence from the US and the extensive margin, there seems to be a
negative relationship between care and the probability of being employed (Van Houvten
et al., 2012; Pavalko and Artis, 1997; Ettner, 1995). As for the intensive margin, the
results are mixed: Ettner (1996) and Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) for example find a
negative relationship between informal care and hours spent in the labor market, which
is contrary Wolf and Soldo (1994), who do not find any significant effects.
Evidence from the UK suggests that caregivers are less likely than non-caregivers to
be employed (Carmichael and Charles, 2003; Charmichael et al., 2010; Michaud et al.,
2010). Heitmueller (2007) finds that not accommodating for endogeneity leads to an
overestimation of the effects of informal caregiving on employment. He only finds negative
impacts for some care types. Carmichael and Charles (2003b) and Heitmueller and Inglis
(2007) find evidence of wage penalties and Parker (1990) finds losses in pensions due to
informal caregiving.
Bolin et al. (2008), Crespo and Mira (2010), Kotsadam (2011), Spiess and Schneider
(2003) and Viitanen (2005), compare European countries. The results of these studies
are also mixed. Using the first wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) database for people aged 55+, Bolin et al. (2008) divide their data into
northern Europe, central Europe, and southern Europe. They find that care has a larger
negative effect on employment in central Europe than in the other country groups, while
wages are less affected in this group than in the other groups.
Crespo and Mira (2010) use the first two waves of the SHARE dataset. They too divide
the sample into three country groups, yet only include daughters caring for their parents.
They find that the effect of informal caregiving on employment is negligible in northern
and central European countries but not in the southern countries.
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Kotsadam (2011) uses data for women aged 20-65 from the European Community House-
hold Panel (ECHP) for 1994-2001. He also finds that while women’s employment and
working hours are negatively associated with provision of informal elder care in southern
Europe, being an informal caregiver is not related to employment in the Nordic countries.
Spiess and Schneider (2003) use the ECHP data from 1994 and 1996 for a sample of
employed women aged 45-59, and find a significant negative relationship between starting
informal care in the Northern countries (except Ireland) and work hours. Increasing
informal caregiving in southern European countries and Ireland leads to a smaller increase
or a higher decrease in work hours than for non-caregivers. They find no relationship
between terminating a care giving commitment or reducing the amount of care hours and
employment.
Viitanen (2005) uses ECHP data for a sample of women aged 20-59 from 13 European
countries. Only in Germany does she find a statistically significant and negative effect
of informal caregiving on labor force participation.Her results indicate a positive state
dependence in the labor force participation in all countries. This means that individuals
who reduce their labor force participation because of care responsibilities will continue to
have a lower labor force participation even after they stop providing care.
There is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of caregiving on labor force outcome
in Europe, with stronger effects for intensive caregivers (Carmichael and Charles, 2003;
Casado-Marin, 2011; Heitmueller, 2007; Spiess and Schneider, 2003). In addition, using
a Spanish sample, Casado-Marin et al. (2011) find that co-residential female caregivers
show stronger negative effects on employment than their non-co-residential counterparts.
Michaud et al. (2010) find the same effect for the UK. There is no consensus on whether
the effects of caregiving are stronger for women than for men; Carmichael and Charles
(2003) find stronger effects for women in the UK, whereas Jakobsson et al. (2013) do not
find any differences in the Nordic countries.
The only available studies focusing on the Nordic countries, i.e., Jakobsson et al. (2013)
for Norway, Sweden, and Denmark and Kotsadam (2012) for Norway, find that informal
caregiving generallyl has no effect on employment and that intensive informal caregiving
has negative and significant effects on labor force participation. They do not find gender
differences in these effects. The study by Jakobsson et al. (2013) however does not
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account for the possibility of an endogeneity bias. This thesis contributes to the research
by comparing these effects in the Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, and Denmark for
both men and women and controlling for a possible endogeneity bias, using the same
dataset as Jakobsson et al. (2013).
4 Context
4.1 The European welfare systems
According to the European Commission and the European Council (2003), there is het-
erogeneity in the ”availability and generosity of public formal care services and long-term
care benefits” among countries in Europe. While those in southern Europe rely heav-
ily on informal care and formal care covers only the basic needs of the very poor, the
northern long-term care systems are more generous and universal. The structure of the
current systems and services is connected to the origins of complex welfare, social security,
and health care systems. These systems developed in different ways in terms of provi-
sion, organization, and funding. Consequently today there is a large mixture of different
strategies and policies in the formal care sector (Tarricone et al., 2008). Not only are the
care systems different, but also the composition of many other factors: for example, the
degree of labor force attachment and the level of education also vary across countries,
with a north-south divide (Crespo and Mira, 2010). The organization and division of
family and market care differ also because of these compositions (Simonazzi, 2009).
Due to these differences, Anttonen and Sipila (1996) found it legitimate to divide the
social care systems in Europe into social care regimes: ”the Scandinavian model of public
services and the southern European family care model.” They suggest that the UK and
central European models, forming two or three models, are not very clear cut. Riedel
and Kraus (2011) divided the European countries into four clusters, depending on the use
and financing of care (see Table 1). The Nordic countries are considered to be generous
with accessible and formalized care. Compared with other countries, there is a low use of
informal care and high public spending on formal care.
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Table 1: Use and financing typology of care
Nature of the system Countries Characteristics
Cluster A
Informal care oriented, low pri-
vate financing
Belgium, Czech Republic, Ger-
many, Slovakia
Low spending, low private, high IC use,
high IC support, cash benefits modest
Cluster B
Generous, accessible, and for-
malised
Denmark, the Netherlands,
Sweden
High spending, low private, low IC use,
high IC support, cash benefits modest
Cluster C
Informal care oriented, high
private financing
Austria, England, Finland,
France, Spain
Medium spending, high private, high IC
use, high IC support, cash benefits high
Cluster D
High private financing, infor-
mal care seems necessary
Hungary, Italy Low spending, high private, high IC use,
low IC support, cash benefits medium
Note: IC = informal care; Source: Kraus et al. 2010
The Nordic care system is also known for its de-familiarizing approach, i.e., the inter-
generational contract of the past has been replaced with a “societal contract” where the
state is responsible for elderly care (Krevers, 2006). While in many countries children
are legally obligated to care for their parents, this is not the case in Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark (Bolin et al., 2008). The formal care services are paid by the public and
are given according to individual needs with the same standards for everyone (Esping-
Andersen and Korpi, 1986 and Kautto et al., 1999) to ensure that each elderly person can
live a ”high quality, independent life for as long as possible” (Fukushima et al., 2010).
This universalistic approach implies a large variety of different public care services such
as institutional care, home care and provision of assistive devices (OECD, 2011). Ac-
cording to Szebehely (2005), these services are ”affordable by the poor and attractive for
the better off.” Anttonen and Sipilae (1996) therefore talk about a ”social service state.”
Although the provision of informal care is lower in the Nordic countries than in the rest
of Europe (Kraus et al., 2011), the question is whether one can group these countries
together or whether there are significant differences in the effect of informal caregiving on
employment outcomes.
4.2 Main Differences in Norway, Sweden and Denmark
Although the Nordic countries are very similar, there are some differences in terms of fund-
ing, coverage, service provision, and recent developments. Table 2 shows the expenditure,
demography, and usage of long-term care for the elderly. Looking at the expenditures,
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Sweden spends 3.2% of its GDP on long-term care, which is the highest figure among
the Nordic countries. This can partly be explained by a higher proportion of elderly
within its population and by a higher usage of the more expensive institutional care in
Sweden. However, the coverage of home care services for people aged 65+ is higher in
Denmark than in Sweden. Danish elderly receive more, albeit smaller amounts of formal
care, than their Swedish counterparts: 11% of the 65+ Danish elderly receive two hours
or less of home care services compared to 3.6% in Sweden. This could be because home
care is targeted more to those with larger care needs in Sweden (Rostgaard and Szebehely,
2012).
Table 2: Expenditure, demography, and usage of long-term care for older people
Norway Sweden Denmark
Lon- term care expenditure, (% of GDP, 2008)
Total public expenditure 2.0 3.6 1.8
Total private expenditure 0.2 0.2
Older people in population (% of population, 2010)
65 years + 14.8 18.1 16.3
80 years + 0.4 0.5 0.4
Public long-term care usage (% of population, 2008)
Total use 3.9 4.2 2.5
Home care use 3.0 2.8 1.7
Institutional care use 0.9 1.4 0.8
Services for older people, coverage
(% of population years 65+, 2008 (Sweden) and 2009 (Denmark))
Elderly care home care services
total
9.2 17.6
Of which:
2h of help per week or less 3.6 11.0
2-20h of help per week 4.7 6.1
20h of help per week or more 0.9 0.5
Source: OECD (2011), Nordic statistical bank (2010) and Rostgaard an Szebehly (2012)
Home care (personal care and practical assistance) is not subject to co-payments in Den-
mark. In Norway and Sweden, municipalities can decide on small co-payments for home
help within legal boundaries. Individuals earning less than a certain amount are exempt
(OECD, 2011 and Fukushima et al., 2010). Rostgaard and Szebehely (2012) argue that
it is cheaper in Sweden to buy formal market care when only small amounts of domestic
help such as cleaning or shopping is needed. This is because user fees must be paid for
publically funded care.
An important difference between the countries is that Norway and Denmark have main-
tained high social investments into their public care systems to both those in need for
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extensive personal care and those in need for small amounts of home care. Sweden, how-
ever, has started to target those with the most need for care and the coverage of public
home care has declined since the 1980s (Rostgaard and Szebehely 2012). This variation
could have led to cross-country differences in the effect of caregiving on employment for
informal caregivers. This suggests that Swedish caregivers might face larger negative
effects of care on employment than their Norwegian or Danish counterparts.
5 Theoretical aspects of care and labor force partic-
ipation
5.1 Possible effects of care on labor force participation
Providing elderly care may be linked to considerable opportunity costs (Johnson and
Wiender, 2006). There are several possible effects of care provision on the labor force
participation: the substitution effect, the income effect, the respite effect, and the dis-
crimination effect.
If the caregiver is time constrained and has to divide the time between working in the
labor market or giving care, there is a substitution effect. The scarcity of time may put
pressure on the responsibility to provide care, which may lead to a reduction in the labor
supply and an increase in care (Heitmueller, 2007). The second effect is the income effect:
working less generally means earning less. The income effect implies that it is more likely
that caregivers remain in the labor force if caring requires extra expenditures (Twigg and
Atkin, 1994), leading to incentives to earn more by increasing labor supply (Charmichael
and Charles, 2003b). Caregivers will choose not to work when the substitution effect
exceeds the income effect (Do, 2008). There can also be a respite effect if the caregiver
needs a break from caregiving and consequently works more than he would without the
emotional demand of caring (Parker, 1993). In addition, a caregiver might lose flexibility
at the workplace due to his unpredictable care duties (Leigh, 2010). This makes him less
job reliable, which could cause discrimination in the labor market and hence to limited
job opportunities (the discrimination effect). These limited job opportunities may lead
to a depressed wage rate and lower monetary returns of work, all else equal (Heitmueller,
2007 and Charmichael and Charles, 2003b). Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) find that the
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opportunity costs of working hours and wage penalties are substantial.
5.2 Trade-off between labor supply and informal care giving
Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) provide a theoretical model of the relationship between
labor supply and caregiving using a broad definition (see Chapter 2) of caregiving. Their
assumptions are that individuals maximize their utility rationally (see, e.g., Becker, 1991)
and are unrestricted in choice (Kooreman and Wunderink, 1997) by allocating their time
of employment and elderly care optimally given their budget constraint. The variables
are defined in Table 3.
Table 3: Definition of variables
Variable Explanation
variables of the child:
c consumption level of the child
T total number of hours available
hw number of hours in paid employment
hk number of hours devoted to parental care
T − hw − hk amount of leisure
w wage
A non-labor income
variables of the parent:
γ own health
ho hours of parental care by other sources
po price of other sources of care
functions
u, v, x strictly concave functions
x the function signifies the level of utility that children derive from
their parents
Individuals consider only the consumption of physical goods u(c), leisure v(T − hw − hk)
and the utility of their elderly parents x(γ, hk, ho) (altruistic behavior). h denotes hours
and γ health of the parent. The subscript w stands for wage, k for care provided to
parents and o for care provided by others. Leisure is assumed to be a normal good. The
utility of the parents x(γ, hk, ho) depends on the health of the parents γ and the amount
of care (formal ho and informal hk) they receive. The utility function of the caregiving
offspring is assumed to be:
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U = u(c) + v(T − hw − hk) + x(γ, hk, ho) (1)
with the two constraints:
c ≤ whw + A (2)
T ≥ hw + hk. (3)
The consumption of the caregiver is not allowed to exceed his financial resources (2).
The time spent on leisure, work and care must not exceed the total amount of time
available (3). Since the individual maximizes utility, equation (2) is binding, and assuming
that he consumes at least some leisure, equation (3) does not bind. The solution of the
maximization problem is that the individual will allocate the time such that the marginal
utilities from working, enjoying leisure, and caregiving equalize.Thus, the individual works
until the extra wage income from an additional hour of work is equal to the value of an
additional hour of leisure and care, respectively. One implication of this is that if there
is an increase in the marginal utility of caregiving, then the individual will increase his
time devoted to caring and decrease leisure and work.
Below, the marginal effects are obtained to conduct comparative statistics. Below, D
is the determinant of the bordered Hessian. I assume D ≤ 0 in order to satisfy the
maximization condition:
∂hw
∂A
=
1
|D|wu
′′
(c)[v
′′
(·) + x22] < 0 (4)
∂hk
∂A
= − 1|D|wu
′′
(c)v
′′
(·) > 0 (5)
∂hw
∂γ
= − 1|D|x21v
′′
(·) (6)
∂hk
∂γ
=
1
|D|x21[v
′′
(·) + w2u′′(c)] (7)
∂hw
∂ho
= − 1|D|x23v
′′
(·) (8)
∂hk
∂ho
=
1
|D|x23[v
′′
(·) + w2u′′(c)] (9)
∂hw
∂T
= − 1|D|x22v
′′
(·) > 0 (10)
∂hk
∂T
= − 1|D|w
2u
′′
(c)v
′′
(·) > 0 (11)
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The model predicts that
- Individuals reduce their labor supply if they increase the number of care hours.
This follows from the budget constraint limiting the available time and the resulting
equalizations of the marginal utilities.
- If there is a change in any of the marginal utilities, the allocation of time will change
for all other activities.
- If non-labor income increases, the individual will work less and increase the amount
of care. There are diminishing returns on the utility of consumption, leading to
reduced marginal utility of consumption. This is because the individual can now
consume more without working more. Hence the individual will consume more,
work less, and devote more time to care. The decrease in working hours exceeds
the increase in caregiving by the absolute value of 1|D|wu
′′
(c)x22: leisure rises with
an increase in non-labor income; (4) and (5). If there is a possibility of financial
transfers to buy formal care (not included in the model here), it may be the case
that the transfer increases but not the time devoted to care for the parent.
- Depending on the sign of x21 = ∂
2x/∂hk∂γ in equations (6) and (7), parental care
and health of the parents are either substitutes or complements. If x21 is negative,
then individuals with parents who need more care will spend more time caring for
their parents. If x21 is positive so that increasing care is more effective if the parent
is in good health, then individuals will reduce their amount of care if the health of
the parent declines.
- Depending on the sign of x23 = ∂
2x/∂hk∂h0 in equations (8) and (9), parental care
and other sources of care are either substitutes or complements. Other sources of
care can be formal care or siblings. This relationship is discussed below.
- A reduced amount of available time reduces the time devoted to caring and work
(equations 10 and 11). This could be due to own health status or caring responsi-
bilities for own dependent children or other people in need of care such as a spouse
or in-laws.
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There might be irrational and restricted choices (Kooreman and Wunderink, 1997), im-
plying that the caregiver cannot choose any combination of work and care hours. Formal
elderly care can also be rationed with for example waiting lists for nursing homes. De-
pending on the size and structure of the caregiver’s family, the care duties could also be
divided by family members (Spiess and Schneider, 2004). Social norms, traditions, and
institutional factors play important roles as well. Moreover, the caregiver or the elderly
may prefer formal care but are not satisfied with the quality of it. A more adequate
model should consider price of formal care and allow for simultaneous decisions on work
and caregiving (Spiess and Schneider, 2004). According to the model, there is a negative
effect of caregiving on the number of hours worked in the market. Depending on how
large this effect is, this could lead to a reduced probability of being employed.
The model of Johnson and Lo Sasso (2000) does not consider the possibility of substituting
own care with formal market care. Simonazzi (2009) builds a model concentrating on the
decision of whether to provide informal care or buy formal care in the market. He builds
on the assumption that the caregivers provides the total amount of care needed, therefore
”other care” in his model is considered as formal market care purchased by the child. His
model builds on constraint (2), which is modified to:
poho + c = whw + A. (12)
The costs of formal care purchased for the parents and the amount of consumption of
the individual cannot exceed total income, equation (12). The child will buy formal care
if his opportunity costs are greater than the price paid for formal care and will provide
informal care if the costs are smaller (Ettner, 1995). If the relative costs of formal care
are reduced, the demand for it will increase. A crucial assumption is that the caregiver
does not face income constraints. If there are income constraints because the amount that
can be earned in the labor market is limited, the caregiver has to either reduce leisure or
consumption or increase informal care (Sinonazzi, 2009).
5.3 Is informal care a substitute or a complement to formal
care?
Caregivers can only substitute informal and formal care if a formal market exists and is
available. In the US, Pezzin and Schone (1999a,b) and Ettner (1995,1996) show that if the
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time costs of potential informal caregivers are lower than the costs of formal care, they will
substitute formal for informal care. Arber and Ginn (1995) find that older individuals,
those with unfavorable economic environments, and those with greater availability of
formal care will do so as well. The way caregivers can decide on their allocation of time
through fixed and inflexible working hours also impacts how much they can complement
formal care (Simonazzi, 2009). Jakobsson, Hansen, and Kotsadam (2012) find evidence
of substitutability between formal and informal care in Norway.
Since there is no country where formal care completely crowds out family care, Bonsang
(2008) concludes that formal and informal care are usually complementary. He argues
that in Nordic countries, formal state-provided care and family care are complements,
while in other countries where formal provision is limited, families try to substitute as
much formal for informal care as possible.
If the care required by the elderly person only requires simple tasks such as grocery shop-
ping or cleaning, then formal and informal care can either be complements or substitutes.
The higher the level of need and disability of the elderly, or put differently, the more qual-
ified the task of caring for the elderly, the more likely it is that family care complements
specialized health care. A higher degree of disability increases the amount of care needed
and the burden it imposes on the caregivers. This may require that both informal and
formal care is required to meet the needs of the elderly, where the family member provides
care in order to improve the formal care services (Bolin et al., 2008 and Bonsang, 2009).
Thus there is probably a stage where formal care becomes a complement to informal care
when the need of the elderly is sufficiently high or the care requires a certain level of
qualified care.
Bolin et al. (2008) conclude that complementarity or substitution between formal and
informal care is an empirical issue. The literature on this is mixed in Europe. There
are two studies focusing on the effect of public support on informal care. Using data
from Norway, England, Germany, Spain, and Israel, Motel-Klingebiel et al. (2005) find
no evidence of a substantial ”crowding out” effect of family help. Using longitudinal
data from 12 European countries, Viitanen (2007) finds that an increase in long-term
care expenditures decreases informal caregiving provided outside the household. Studies
focusing on the effect of informal care on the use of formal care while controlling for
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endogeneity usually find that informal care substitutes for formal care. Using a sample
of single-living elderly in Europe, Bolin et al. (2008) examine the effect of informal
care on the use of different types of formal and medical care. They find that informal
care substitutes for formal home care, while it complements doctor and hospital visits.
Bonsang (2009) concludes that informal care is a substitute for long-term care as long as
the care requires only simple tasks and the amount of care needed is low.
Since there is a large and generous formal care sector in the Nordic countries, I expect
formal and informal care to be complements. As all elderly in need of care can easily get
help in the Nordic countries, it is likely that informal care givers complement this care
with actions that do not require large amounts of time or money such as helping with
paperwork or grocery shopping.
5.4 Endogeneity
A caregiver might feel emotionally or morally compelled once the need for care of a relative
occurs. If the caring decision hence does not depend on the economic circumstances, the
decision to care is exogenous to the employment/labor market decision (Camichael et al.,
2010). In this case, the caregiving indicator would enter the regression on the labor force
participation as an exogenous variable directly (Crespo, 2006), which, as Ettner (1996)
stated, is the simplest but less realistic option. If people for example do have an option
of choice in this decision, endogeneity might occur. This is the case if the care and labor
force participation choices are interrelated decisions, which Ettner (1996), Carmichael and
Charles (1998), and Bolin et al. (2007) find in their research. With endogeneity, it is hard
to make causal inferences such as that giving more informal health increases a person’s
probability of dropping out of the labor force (Carmichael et al., 2010).
Endogeneity occurs if
- the decision of informal caregiving and labor force participation are made simulta-
neously (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). There might be a correlation between
informal and formal care because of unobserved negative health characteristic that
probably increase the demand for both formal and informal care (Charles and Sevak,
2005) or because unobserved preferences affect both types of care used (Bonsang,
2009),
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- the decision of whom in the family provides informal care depends on other en-
dogenous decision variables such as employment status of the children or number of
dependent children in the family of the potential caregiver (Crespo, 2006),
- the demand for parental care is not seen as given. There is a choice of refraining
from caregiving because there are alternatives such as formal market-based care or
at least formal and informal care are substitutes (Crespo, 2006). The relationship
between the substitution of formal and informal care is likely to differ between the
types of formal care available (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004, Bolin et al., 2008),
or
- the individual has unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the propensity
to care for the parent and the propensity to be employed (Casado-Mar´ın et al., 2011).
It is not certain whether there is an endogeneity problem in the Nordic countries. It
might be the case that individuals there do not consider the possibility of having to
care for a parent when deciding what job to take since the formal care sector is widely
available and accepted. Further, it might not be the case that a family divides the care
responsibilities according to decision variables, or at least the decision to have kids may
not be correlated with the concern of having to care for a parent. Moreover the formal and
informal sector could be complements. However, if there is endogeneity, an exogeneity
assumption would lead to a bias in the estimation of the effect of informal parental care
on labor force participation. The direction of the bias is a priori not clear (Crespo, 2006).
An investigation of whether there is an endogeneity problem is therefore necessary.
The possible problem of endogeneity may be solved by using panel data, first differences
and/or dedicated questionnaires or instrumental variables (Charmichael et al., 2010). The
panel data approach was used by, e.g., Spiess and Schneider (2003) and Pavalko and Artis
(1997). Carmichael et al. (2008) used a dedicated questionaire while Kotsadam (2012),
Bolin et al. (2008), Heitmueller (2007), and Ettner (1996) used the instrumental variables
approach. This thesis will apply the instrumental variable approach.
17
6 Data, Sample and Descriptive Statistics
6.1 Data
In 2010, TNS Gallup (www.tns-gallup.se) sent out a longitudinal Internet-based survey
to 4,500 Danes, 4,500 Norwegians, and 3,252 Swedes aged 18–65, of whom 2,088 (46.4 %)
Danes, 1,705 (52.4 %) Swedes, and 2,371 (52.7 %) Norwegians responded (in total 6,164
out of 12,252 or 50.3 %). The survey included questions about informal care, employment,
and demographics. The respondents had three weeks to answer the survey and received
three reminders.
Jakobsson et al. (2013) used the same dataset in their descriptive thesis ”Informal el-
dercare and care for disabled children in the Nordic countries: prevalence and relation to
employment.” For more information on the data, please see their paper.
6.2 Variables
Respondents were asked about their employment status and are considered to have been
employed if they were working full or part time. The respondents were asked whether they
had helped a family member, relative, friend, or neighbor who needed help in everyday
life due to long-term illness, disability, or old age at least once a month in the past year
(see Appendix). The data has the advantage of also providing the number of care hours
and not just the caregiving status. A respondent is considered to provide parental care
if he spent at least 1 hour per month caring for his parents or parents in law. Intensive
caregivers are individuals providing at least 30 hours of care each month. The dividing
line is somewhat arbitrarily chosen and different operationalizations of intensive care will
be analyzed and discussed in Section 8.5.
It would have beenbeneficial to also have data on what kind of care the parent/parent in
law needed. Further, there is no information about how much care the parents/parent in
law received in total and how the care was divided between formal care, informal care,
and other informal care provided by other friends and relatives.
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6.3 Controls
The dataset includes information aboutrespondent characteristics that are likely to in-
fluence their employment status and the time they care for their parents. These vari-
ables include age, gender, education, personal income, living in a capital, being mar-
ried/cohabiting, and living with dependent children (see Table 4).
Table 4: Definition of variables
Variable Explanation
Dependent Variables
Employed = 1 if employed full or part time
Main independent variables
Parentcare = 1 if respondent provides informal parental care
Parentintensive = 1 if respondent provides parental care for 30h or more per month
Parentcarehours Number of hours of informal parental care, truncated at 99 hours
per month
Control variables
Age respondent age
Agesq respondent age squared
Female = 1 if female
Highed = 1 if at least some university education
Lowed = 1 if respondent has elementary education or less
High income = 1 if respondent is above the 75th percentile of the national income
in the dataset
Low income = 1 if respondent is below the 25th percentile of the national income
in the dataset
Capital = 1 if living in the capital (Oslo, Stockholm or Copenhagen)
Married = 1 if respondent is married or cohabiting
Children number of children living in the household, truncated at 3 children
Possible Instruments
Parentage age of oldest parent
Parentinneed = 1 if at least one parent needs
Education is considered to be high if the respondent had completed at least some higher
education and low if he had only completed elementary education or less. I group the
income variable in relation to country-specific percentiles. More exactly the variable low
income contains the 25% poorest people in the country and the variable high income the
25% richest.
Studies including caregivers and non caregivers showed that older people regardless of
care intensity (e.g. Carmichael et al., 2005; Dentinger and Clarkberg, 2002 Pavalko and
Artis, 1997; Wakabayashi and Donato, 2005), less educated or experienced individuals
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(e.g., Dentinger and Clarkberg, 2002; Pavalko and Artis, 1997; Spiess and Schneider,
2003), people with poor health (e.g., Dentinger and Clarkberg, 2002; Pavalko and Artis,
1997; Spiess and Schneider, 2003), women with young children at home (Carmichael and
Charles, 2003a,b; Ettner, 1996; Wolf and Soldo, 1994), married women (Leigh, 2010) and
women in general (Leigh, 2010) are more likely to exit the labor force and provide care. It
is therefore important to control for these variables in order to avoid an omitted variable
bias.
It would have been good to also include household income, own health, distance to par-
ent/parent in law, and number of siblings as controls to see whether this makes a dif-
ference. However, the data set does not provide this information. The results are fairly
stable when confounding factors are controlled for (see Table 8). Hence, additional control
variables would probably not change the results.
6.4 Instruments
To adjust for the potential endogeneity bias, Carmichael et al. (2005) suggest using
instruments that are related to the health status of the parent, with the instruments
acting as a third variable. They should affect the variable employment only through the
care variable in order to estimate the causal effect if care is endogenous (see Figure 2).
The instrumental variable must be uncorrelated with the error term (u) consisting of the
endogeneous part of the care variable. Thus, the effect of care on employment can be
estimated via the instrument variable.
Instrumental 
variable 
Care Employment 
u 
Figure 2: Instrumental variable approach (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009)
In this thesis, two instruments are considered: age of oldest parent and having a parent
who is in need of help. The instruments must be valid and relevant in order to provide
consistent estimators. To be valid, an instrument has to be correlated with the decision to
care but uncorrelated with the dependent variable employment other than through caring
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(see also Chapter 8). The relevance of the instrumental variable can be tested, yet the
exclusion restrictions for validity can not be tested.
The instrument variables relate to the health of the parents. While it is likely that having
parents in need of help is correlated with the caring decision (relevance), it is not likely
to affect own labor participation other than through the need of having to provide care
(validity) (Heitmueller, 2007; Bolin et al., 2008). Once personal age is held constant, the
age of the parent is correlated with the demand for informal care (relevance) but should
not have an impact on the labor market participation of the carergiver
The dataset provides only limited information about the specific care needs of the parents.
It does not contain any information on how much care the parent receives in total or on
whether and how much formal care services the parent gets. Furthermore, while the
questionnaire concerns care for both the respondent’s parents or parents-in-law it only
asks about his own parents’ age and need for help. As a result the instruments will exclude
individuals caring for only their parents in law but not their own parents (see Section 8.3
for a discussion).
6.5 Sample and Descriptive Statistics
The sample is restricted to people aged 18-65. Table 4 gives a summary of the main
variables and table 5 shows their summary statistics. The data is generally fairly rep-
resentative in terms of gender and age. Looking at OECD statistics, the proportions
of the respective populations are similar to those found in the dataset (compare OECD
2011, Chapter 3). However, the dataset is biased towards the more educated (around
50%, while it is around 33% according to official statistics for the studied countries, see
OECD, 2013). The employment rate is fairly representative overall as well as for Norway
and Denmark. However, the employment rate is biased towards employment in Sweden
(compare OECD Statistics 2011). When comparing raw correlations and mean values,
the bias in education should be considered. However, as education is controlled for in the
regression analysis, the problem is somewhat alleviated. The employment bias in Sweden
is of greater concern since it is the dependent variable. The regression can be estimated
consistently; however the estimates will be less precise due to of larger standard errors
(Wooldrige, 2009).
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Table 5: Summary statistics of main variables
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Dependent variables
Employed 0.734 0.442 0 1 6112
Main independent variables
Parentcare 0.233 0.423 0 1 6164
Parentintensive 0.029 0.168 0 1 6164
Parentcarehours 13.542 17.885 1 99 1434
Control variables
Age 44.187 13.572 15 65 6164
Agesq 2136.616 1152.161 225 4225 6164
Female 0.505 0.500 0 1 6164
Higheduc 0.482 0.500 0 1 6164
Loweduc 0.096 0.294 0 1 6164
High income 0.325 0.469 0 1 6164
Low income 0.324 0.468 0 1 6164
Capital 0.183 0.387 0 1 6164
Married 0.700 0.458 0 1 6164
Children 0.746 1.006 0 3 6164
Possible Instruments
Parentage 69.291 11.977 36 100 4588
Parentinneed 0.137 0.344 0 1 6164
Around 23% of all the respondents in the three countries provide some care and 2.9% are
classified as intensive caregivers. An average caregiver spends around 13.5 hours a month
caring for his parents/parents in law (Table 5). Looking at the numbers for careoverall
and parental care and at the differences between the countries (Table 6), 42.8% of the
respondents provided care to either a partner, disabled child, parent, or other relative,
friend or neighbor. Looking at the countries individually, the Danes have the highest
proportion of caregivers (care overall: 46.8% ; parental care: 26.4%) and the Swedish the
lowesr (37.1% and 20.9%, respectively). However, among those who provide care, Swedes
on average provide the most care hours (15.83) and Danes the least (11.65).
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics: care overall and parental care by country
Obs Care overall Parental care
Share of sample Hours/month Share of sample Hours/month
Total 6164 0.428 13.02 0.233 13.54
(0.495) (18.43) (0.423) (17.88)
Norway 2371 0.433 12.61 0.221 13.97
(0.496) (16.38) (0.415) (16.34)
Sweden 1705 0.371 16.40 0.209 15.83
(0.483) (25.11) (0.407) (23.63)
Denmark 2088 0.468 11.25 0.264 11.65
(0.499) (14.70) (0.441) (14.49)
Standard deviations in parentheses
Rostgaard and Szebehly (2012) also find that it is much more common in Denmark to
receive help than in Sweden but that the amount of care hours is higher in Sweden. Since
the questionnaire views very general tasks such as cleaning, paperwork, personal care or
going outside (see Appendix) as caregiving, the numbers are higher than in other studies
(e.g., Alber and Ko¨hler, 2004). However, the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in
Europe (SHARE) (e.g., Ogg and Renaut, 2006) shows even larger numbers, this indicating
that the numbers from the questionnaire regarding caregiving are indeed representative.
Table 7 compares the mean values for non-provider, providers, and intensiveproviders of
parental care overall and by country. Overall, intensive caregivers have a significantly
lower employment rate than non-intensive caregivers. In all three countries, caregivers
have a significantly higher probability of beeing employed than non-caregivers. The re-
lationship between caregiving and employment does not differ significantly between in-
tensive caregivers and non-caregivers. Intensive caregivers are older and more likely to
be women, married, and higher educated. They also have a higher income and are less
likely to have dependent children. Not surprisingly, caregivers have older parents and are
more likely to have parents in need of care. The age of the parent and the proportion of
respondents stating that their parents need help do not increase from being a caregiver
to being an intensive caregiver. This is probably due to the fact that caring for parents
in law does not influence the caregiver’s own parents’ need for care but only the hours
spent with caring for parents in law. Since the questionnaire is not precise in the distinc-
tion between own parents and parents in law, caregivers do not have older parents than
intensive caregivers nor are they more likely to have parents in need of care.
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics by parental care status
Non Caregiver Intensive Non Caregiver Intensive
caregiver caregiver caregiver caregiver
Employed 0.722 0.776*** 0.691* High income 0.352 0.419*** 0.362
Norway 0.703 0.745** 0.671 Norway 0.335 0.380** 0.328
Sweden 0.777 0.874*** 0.783 Sweden 0.295 0.364*** 0.386
Denmark 0.697 0.741** 0.644 Denmark 0.428 0.495*** 0.386*
Parentcare hours 13.54*** 52.61*** Low income 0.344 0.260*** 0.285
Norway 13.97*** 48.03*** Norway 0.356 0.318* 0.356
Sweden 15.83*** 67.85*** Sweden 0.395 0.280*** 0.283
Denmark 11.65*** 46.52*** Denmark 0.283 0.192*** 0.200
Age 42.44 49.96*** 50.49*** Capital 0.196 0.142*** 0.190
Norway 39.87 48.64*** 51.45*** Norway 0.177 0.090*** 0.151
Sweden 43.32 51.57*** 50.11*** Sweden 0.174 0.193 0.326***
Denmark 44.75 50.16*** 49.62** Denmark 0.237 0.158*** 0.133*
Agesq 1992 2612*** 2678*** Married 0.678 0.771*** 0.754*
Norway 1782 2493*** 2785*** Norway 0.652 0.747*** 0.699
Sweden 2060 2756*** 2644*** Sweden 0.677 0.751*** 0.696
Denmark 2187 2632*** 2575** Denmark 0.711 0.808*** 0.867**
Female 0.498 0.528** 0.598*** Children 0.778 0.641*** 0.525***
Norway 0.502 0.520 0.589* Norway 0.553 0.415*** 0.164***
Sweden 0.470 0.515* 0.609** Sweden 1.268 1.207 1.217
Denmark 0.518 0.543 0.600 Denmark 0.618 0.489*** 0.433*
High education 0.486 0.471 0.503 Parent age 66.94 77.12*** 76.04***
Norway 0.583 0.562 0.534 Norway 64.98 76.07*** 76.02***
Sweden 0.454 0.485 0.478 Sweden 68.43 79.47*** 78.59***
Denmark 0.396 0.375 0.483* Denmark 68.17 76.68*** 73.50*
Low education 0.100 0.082** 0.101 Parent in need 0.073 0.349*** 0.330***
Norway 0.065 0.048* 0.082 Norway 0.066 0.341*** 0.342***
Sweden 0.127 0.115 0.130 Sweden 0.065 0.375*** 0.435***
Denmark 0.118 0.094* 0.100 Denmark 0.090 0.341*** 0.233**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The findings above imply that it is important to control for individual level factors. Con-
trolling for these factors, the correlation between informal parental care and employment
probability will be lower than the around 3 percentage points. Since the countries differ in
composition, I will in the following control for potential confounding differences between
the countries.
Table 8 presents the he marginal effects after a probit regression for parental care and
intensive parental care as well as the marginal effects of parental care hours after an
ordinary least square regression. Denmark is the excluded country in the regressions,
thus the variables Sweden and Norway show the difference between Denmark and the two
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countries, respectively. The amount of care hours for Denmark is the constant term.
Table 8: Decriptive statistics by parental care status with controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES parentcare parentcare parentintensive parentintensive parentcarehours parentcarehours
sweden -0.053*** -0.029** -0.002 0.002 4.172*** 3.799***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (1.210) (1.304)
norway -0.041*** -0.004 0.002 0.006 2.319** 2.461**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (1.086) (1.117)
age 0.020*** 0.002 -0.452
(0.003) (0.001) (0.283)
agesq -1.45e-04*** -7.20e-06 0.006*
(3.41e-05) (1.24e-05) (0.003)
capital -0.039*** 0.004 3.385**
(0.014) (0.006) (1.371)
female 0.044*** 0.013*** 3.386***
(0.011) (0.004) (0.951)
highed -0.031*** 0.001 0.062
(0.011) (0.004) (1.006)
lowed -0.012 0.007 -0.050
(0.020) (0.008) (1.801)
highincome 0.008 -0.008* -1.984*
(0.013) (0.004) (1.130)
lowincome -0.036*** -0.007 0.087
(0.014) (0.005) (1.281)
married 0.030** 0.004 -1.245
(0.013) (0.004) (1.224)
children -0.015** -0.004 -0.025
(0.006) (0.002) (0.585)
Constant 11.65*** 17.99***
(0.758) (6.239)
Observations 6,164 6,164 6,164 6,164 1,434 1,434
R-squared 0.009 0.031
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects after probit regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
When controlling for confounding factors, the relations are fairly stable. This strengthens
the hypothesis that the country differences reflect compositional factors. Swedes provide
significantly less care than Norwegians and Danes, while there are no statistically sig-
nificant differences between the latter two countries. There are no significant differences
in intensive caregiving between the countries. Columns 5 and 6 show that the number
of hours devoted to care among those who provide care differs significantly between the
countries.
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This is in line with the literature and the findings in Chapter 4: the Danish elderly
receive more, but smaller amounts of care than the Swedish (see also, e.g., Rostgaard and
Szebehly, 2012 and OECD, 2011). The dataset concerns the providers of care. Since the
amount of caregiving and care received generally must be the same, these numbers should
be similar also when looking at informal care. The Danish respondents provide the most
care when looking at giving at least some care. They provide the least amount of hours
of care.
Table 9: Parental care by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Basic With controls Norway Sweden Denmark
sweden -0.053*** -0.029**
(0.013) (0.014)
norway -0.041*** -0.004
(0.012) (0.013)
age 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
agesq -1.45e-04*** -1.82e-04*** -1.95e-04*** -1.27e-04**
(3.41e-05) (5.45e-05) (6.78e-05) (6.29e-05)
female 0.044*** 0.034** 0.039** 0.049**
(0.011) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
highed -0.031*** -0.029 -0.013 -0.042**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
lowed -0.012 0.009 -0.019 -0.023
(0.020) (0.041) (0.031) (0.033)
highincome 0.008 0.005 -0.006 0.013
(0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023)
lowincome -0.036*** -0.020 -0.033 -0.045*
(0.014) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027)
capital -0.039*** -0.064*** 0.006 -0.061***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
married 0.030** 0.007 0.027 0.070***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.021) (0.026)
children -0.015** -0.026** -0.003 -0.027**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013)
Observations 6,164 6,164 2,371 1,705 2,088
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects after probit regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Deepening the analysis to see whether there are differences across the countries in parental
care, Table 9 shows the descriptive statistic with controls for each country. Married/cohabiting
people and women provide significantly more care, while low educated provide less care
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in Denmark than others. This is not the case in Sweden and Norway. Living in Oslo
or Copenhagen is associated with providing significantly more care as opposed to not
living in the capital. Respondents in Stockholm do not significantly differ in the amount
of caring for their parents than other Swedes. Having a dependent child is significantly
associated with providing less care in Norway and Denmark, but not in Sweden. Women
and older people provide significantly more care in all countries.
7 Empirical Strategy
The empirical model consists of analyzing the relationship between informal parental care
and employment. Issues addressed by the analysis are: endogeneity and different cutoffs
for intensive caregiving. The approach used follows the method employed by Kotsadam
(2012).
Since employment and care are binary variables, a limited dependent variable approach
will be used. Only including individuals who are employed and who provide family care
would lead to sample bias (Heckman, 1979). This is because caregivers who work are
likely to differ from their non-working counterparts in unobservable ways (Johnson and
Sasso, 2000). The effect of being a caregiver on the probability of being employed can be
estimated with a probit regression:
I(employed = 1|X) = I(α + βparentcare+ δX > )
Where as being employed is a binary variable representing employment, parentcare is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual provides care, X is a vector of control variables
(see Table 4), and  is the unobservable random disturbance term, which is assumed to
be normally distributed. The employment variable is binary, and by using a probit model
the estimable equation is
Pr(employed = 1|X) = G(Xδ).
Here G(Xδ) is the standard normal cumulative density function. The care variable is now
included in the vector X.
The question of whether individuals work less in order to provide care or rather take
on care responsibilities due to lack of employment opportunities is not clear cut. If the
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decision is endogenous, i.e., the reasoning goes in both directions so that the distinction
between the dependent and independent variable is uncertain (Gujarati, 2003), there will
be a correlation between the error term with the explanatory variables, i.e. ,Cov(X, ) 6=
0, which contradicts the crucial assumption of E(X|) = 0. This leads to biased and
inconsistent estimates. It is therefore not possible to have an approach with labor supply
as the dependent variable on the left side and informal care as the independent variable
of interest on the right hand side of the equation, as this would give biased effects of
caregiving on labor force participation (e.g., Johnson and Sasso, 2000; Bolin et al., 2007;
Doty et al., 1998).
To adjust for this problem, an instrumental variable (IV) approach is used. Amemiya
(1978, 1979) introduced this method, which is more efficient than many other two-stage
estimators in simultaneous equation models with limited dependent variables, especially
if there is a small sample and weak instruments (Lee, 1991). In the first stage, the
endogenous explanatory variable parental care/intensive parental care is treated as a
linear function of the two instruments parentage and parentinneed and the exogenous
control variables. The second stage uses the predictions of the endogenous variable as an
explanatory variable in the main equation.
8 Results
First the results of an ordinary probit regression are presented, followed by the results of
using the IV method with one and two instruments.
8.1 Normal Regression
Table 10 showa the marginal effect of being a caregiver or intensive caregiver and the effect
of care hours from the probit regression. Controlling for confounding factors, there is no
statistically significant relationship between employment and caregiving. This also holds
when looking at the individual countries: the relationship is not statistically different
from zero in any of the Nordic countries. There is a small negative significant relationship
between intensive parental caregiving and employment. An intensive caregiver has an 8.7
percentage point lower probability of being employed. These findings are in line with the
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literature: Focusing on European countries Kotsadam (2011) finds no effect of providing
informal elderly care on the probability of being employed in the Nordic countries, and
looking at Norway and differencing between care and intensive care, Kotsadam (2012)
finds that only providing substantial care is related to employment in Norway.
Table 10: Effect on employment
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Parentcare Parentintensive Parentcarehours
Care X -0.019 -0.087** -0.002***
(0.015) (0.038) (5.94e-04)
sweden 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.133***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
norway 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025)
age 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.082***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
agesq -9.93e-04*** -9.92e-04*** -8.94e-04***
(3.74e-05) (3.73e-05) (8.14e-05)
female -0.007 -0.007 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.023)
highed 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.041*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.024)
lowed -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.066
(0.024) (0.024) (0.046)
highincome 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.106***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.025)
lowincome -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.084***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.032)
capital 0.013 0.014 -4.18 e-04
(0.015) (0.015) (0.033)
married -0.014 -0.014 -0.043
(0.013) (0.013) (0.027)
children -0.007 -0.007 0.019
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
Observations 6,112 6,112 1,416
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects after probit regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11 contains the results for intensive care in the different countries. Overall, there is
a significant negative effect of being an intensive caregiver in the nordic countries on the
probability of being employed (Column 1). However, the results are insignificant when
limiting the dataset to the specific countries: intensive caregiving has no statistically
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significant effect on the probability of being employed in Norway, Sweden, or Denmark
individually (Columns 2-4), and there furthermore are no differences between the countries
with respect to this effect (Column 5).
Table 11: Employment by country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Parentintensive Norway Sweden Denmark Care dummies
parentintensive -0.087** -0.046 -0.096 -0.096 -0.114*
(0.040) (0.058) (0.083) (0.069) (0.065)
sweden 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.013) (0.013)
swedintense 0.023
(0.088)
norway 0.040*** 0.038***
(0.014) (0.014)
norintense 0.037
(0.066)
age 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.088***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
agesq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(3.56e-05) (6.36e-05) (5.92e-05) (6.57e-05) (3.56e-05)
female -0.007 -0.007 2.35e-04 -0.025 -0.007
(0.012) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.012)
highed 0.052*** 0.095*** 0.003 0.037 0.052***
(0.013) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.013)
lowed -0.072*** -0.131** -0.056* -0.071* -0.072***
(0.022) (0.051) (0.032) (0.037) (0.022)
highincome 0.151*** 0.065** 0.157*** 0.237*** 0.151***
(0.013) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.013)
lowincome -0.135*** -0.132*** -0.096*** -0.192*** -0.135***
(0.016) (0.026) (0.023) (0.033) (0.016)
capital 0.014 -0.012 0.016 0.005 0.014
(0.015) (0.028) (0.022) (0.026) (0.015)
married -0.014 0.023 -0.002 -0.097*** -0.014
(0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.014)
children -0.007 0.009 -0.025*** 0.002 -0.007
(0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007)
Observations 6,112 2,329 1,705 2,078 6,112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects after probit regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Kotsadam (2012) and Jakobsson et al. (2013) present similar results for Norway and
Norway, Sweden and Denmark respectively. The European literature generally finds het-
erogeneity in the impact of caregiving on employment, with a stronger negative effect for
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intensive caregivers (e.g., Charmichael and Charles, 2003b; Casado-Mar´ın et al., 2011;
Heitmueller 2007; Spiess and Schneider, 2003).
The effect of being a female [intensive] caregiver on employment does not statistically
differ from being a male [intensive] caregiver in any of the regressions. The same can
be said about married/cohabiting women, capital inhabitants, high-educated and high-
income individuals compared with their counterparts (results are available on request).
This is in line with the findings of Jakobsson et al. (2013) for Norway, Sweden and
Denmark.
Summarizing the results, there is no significant correlation between employment and
being a caregiver in general. However, intensive caregivers are significantly less likely to
be employed, and there are no specific differences between the countries in this respect.
8.2 IV Regression with two Instruments
As discussed, there is a possible endogeneity problem. To tackle this problem, an IV
approach is used with two potential instruments: the age of the oldest parent and whether
at least one of the parents is in need of care. Validity has been discussed above. I will
now investigate whether the instruments are relevant.
The AGLS regression is shown in Table 12. Column 2T shows the first stage of the
regression. Having a parent in need for help is highly significant and correlated with
intensive parental care in the expected direction. This indicates that the instrument is
relevant. Yet the second instrument, parental age, is not different from zero and is hence
insignificant and not relevant. Thus the age of the parent cannot be used as an instrument
for intensive parental care as it fails the relevance criterion.
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Table 12: Employment, parentintensive treated as endogeneous: two instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES employed parentintensive athrho lnsigma
parentintensive 0.874
(1.262)
sweden 0.393*** 0.008
(0.068) (0.006)
norway 0.123** 0.007
(0.059) (0.006)
age 0.293*** -9.71e-04
(0.014) (0.001)
agesq -0.003*** 1.79e-05
(1.62e-04) (1.81e-05)
female -0.056 0.013***
(0.049) (0.004)
highed 0.150*** 0.005
(0.052) (0.005)
lowed -0.309*** 0.009
(0.079) (0.010)
highincome 0.542*** -0.006
(0.066) (0.006)
lowincome -0.400*** -0.002
(0.058) (0.006)
capital 0.005 0.006
(0.058) (0.006)
married -0.006 0.003
(0.053) (0.006)
children -0.023 5.22e-04
(0.025) (0.002)
parentage 8.85e-05
(4.92e-04)
parentinneed 0.052***
(0.009)
Constant -5.326*** -0.002 -0.179 -1.911***
(0.281) (0.035) (0.193) (0.046)
Observations 4,556 4,556 4,556 4,556
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients after AGLS regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
8.3 IV Regression with one instrument
Only one of the potential instruments passed the relevance criterion. The instrument
left is whether parents are in need of help. The results of the AGLS regression with one
instrument are shown in Column 2 and 3 of Table 13. The probit coefficients in Column
1 are shown for comparison. The controls in the probit and the second stage of the AGLS
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regression are almost the same. In the IV method, the effect of the variable parentintensive
is reduced and the standard errors are increased, making the variable insignificant.
Table 13: Employment, parentintensive treated as exogenous and endogenous
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES employed employed parentintensive athrho lnsigma
parentintensive -0.272** -0.037
(0.114) (1.401)
sweden 0.488*** 0.487*** 0.004
(0.055) (0.056) (0.006)
norway 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.007
(0.048) (0.050) (0.006)
age 0.301*** 0.300*** 3.75e-04
(0.010) (0.011) (0.001)
agesq -0.003*** -0.003*** 5.66e-06
(1.21e-04) (1.24e-04) (1.33e-05)
female -0.024 -0.027 0.013***
(0.040) (0.044) (0.004)
highed 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.001
(0.043) (0.044) (0.005)
lowed -0.228*** -0.230*** 0.006
(0.066) (0.067) (0.009)
highincome 0.560*** 0.561*** -0.008
(0.055) (0.056) (0.006)
lowincome -0.437*** -0.435*** -0.006
(0.048) (0.050) (0.006)
capital 0.049 0.047 0.006
(0.051) (0.052) (0.006)
married -0.049 -0.050 0.005
(0.047) (0.047) (0.005)
children -0.025 -0.024 -0.003
(0.023) (0.024) (0.002)
parentinneed 0.042***
(0.009)
Constant -5.516*** -5.507*** -0.015 -0.039 -1.800***
(0.209) (0.224) (0.022) (0.232) (0.036)
Observations 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients after Probit/AGLS regression.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Using an IV approach always increases the standard errors:
Avar(βˆIV ) =
σ2
nσ2care
1
ρ2care,parentinneed
≥ σ
2
nσ2care
= Avar(βˆOLS). (13)
The inflation of the standard error with instrumental variables depends on the correlation
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between the instrument and the dependent variable:
R2care,parentinneed = ρˆ
2
care,parentinneed < 1. (14)
The first stage regression (Column 3) indicates the relevance of our instrument. The vari-
able parentinneed is highly statistically significant but small. The F-statistic is F (1, 6100) =
44.96. The general rule set by Staiger and Stock (1997) is that an F above 10 indicates a
good instrument and this is clearly the case here. Additionally, the instrument points in
the expected direction and therefore strengthens its validity. Using the Smith–Blundell
test, we cannot reject that parental intensive care is exogenous since we have χ = 0.006
and p = 0.94. Other tests such as the Wu-Hausman or the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test
after a two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS) do not reject the null hypothesis of exo-
geneity either. This contributes to the literature suggesting that intensive caregiving does
not have an endogeneity problem (e.g., Kotsadam, 2012). In their review paper, Lilly et
al. (2007) conclude that nopapers using valid IV estimators find evidence of endogenous
labor force participation (Bolin et al., 2007 and Heitmueller, 2007).
Table 14 compares the general AGLS regression in Columns 1-4 with the results for the
specific countries: Norway in Columns 5-8, Sweden in Columns 9-12, and Denmark in
Columns 13-16. The variable parentintensive is not significant in any of the regressions
and has large standard errors, especially for Denmark. In all countries except Denmark,
the instrument passes the relevance criterion. This could be because in Denmark informal
care provision is not related to the need of one’s parents as individuals who need care get
help for free. Thus, care could be more of a complement in Denmark than in the other
countries.
Exogeneity can not be rejected in any of the regressions. This could be because formal
care is widely available and hence individuals do not adjust their employment behavior
before they actually face someone in need of help. If one’s parents do need help, the care
decision probably influences employment but not vice versa.
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The regression excludes respondents with healthy parents who care for their parents in
law because the instrument is a ”parent in need of help” and not ”parent or parent in-law
in need of help.” The IV estimator can only find local average treatment effects (LATE),
but not average treatment effects (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Therefore the effect of
intensive caregiving is only revealed for the who care for their parents/parents in law and
who have own parents in need of care (compliers) but not for ”never takers” (those who
would never care for their parents) or ”always takers” including individuals with parents
who do not need care but who care for their parents in-law.
8.4 Gender effects
I did not find any gender differences in the effect of parental care on employment (see
Section 8.1). No comparable European study investigated gender differences (i.e., Bolin
et al., 2008; Crespo and Mira, 2010; Kotsadam, 2011; Spiess and Schneider, 2003; Vitta-
nen, 2005), with all except one study (Bolin et al., 2008) restricting the data to women.
While country studies in the US (e.g., Van Houvten et al., 2012) and in the UK (e.g.,
Charmichael and Charles, 2003b; Heitmueller and Inglis, 2007) have found gender differ-
ences in employment, Kotsadam (2012) did not find any in Norway.
A possible reason why no gender differences in effects are found in the Nordic countries
could be that they have more positive attitudes towards gender equality (Jakobsson and
Kotsadam, 2013) and that labor market opportunities are more equal for men and women
(compare OECD, 2012). Using ECHP data, Bettio and Planenga (2004) found that the
gender gap in care provision was smallest in Denmark when comparing 14 European
countries (Norway and Sweden were not included). Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2013)
found no differences between Sweden and Norway regarding views on sharing household
responsibilities equally.
The reason I did not find any gender differences could also be data related: Part of the
care hours reported by married men could actually be carried out by their wives. It could
also be the case that the number of male caregivers in the data is too small to detect
statistically significant effects (577 of the 6,164 respondents are intensive parental male
caregivers).
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8.5 Different operationalizations of intensive care
Being an intensive caregiver has a negative effect on the probability of being employed
in the Nordic countries. However, the classification was somewhat arbitrarily defined as
providing care at least 30 hours a month. Looking at different operationalizations of
intensive care in the probit estimation in Table 15 reveals that providing care less than ”5
hours or more a month” has no negative significant effect. Figure 3 shows the marginal
effects with the confidence intervals from Table 15. Comparing the different coefficients,
the relationship when increasing the number of care hours does not change as much as
one would expect. From caring 15 to 35 hours or more a month, the coefficients are
essentially the same while standard errors are increasing. This could indicate that the
effect of caregiving is very small. Only looking at women, the effect increases with care
intensity, yet men and women do not statistically significantly differ in this effect (results
are available on request). There were furthermore no country differences between the
different operationalizational levels.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects of different operationalizations of intensive caregiving
Another explanation could be that the question asked abour care is very vague. The
definition of givingcare in the dataset includes going for a walk with the parents or doing
some paperwork during weekends. This type of caregiving should not have any or only
small effects on the probability of being employed. Personal daily care such as helping
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the parent get dressed, which probably implies considerable time commitments during
the week, could have larger effects. It is not possible to disentangle these different forms
of care in the dataset. Assuming that the stable relationship between caring 20 hours
or more and caring 35 hours or more comes from helping with administrative or small
amounts of household work, the results seem reasonable.
Table 15: Different operationalizations of intensive care and its effect on employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES 5 hours 10 hours 15 hours 20 hours 25 hours 30 hours 35 hours
parentintensiveX -0.044** -0.047** -0.091*** -0.095*** -0.066* -0.087** -0.095**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.035) (0.038) (0.046)
age 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
agesq -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(3.73e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.73e-05) (3.73e-05)
female -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
highed 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
lowed -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
highincome 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
lowincome -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.135***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
capital 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
married -0.013 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
children -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
sweden 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.0135) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
norway 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112 6,112
Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects after probit regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
9 Conclusion
Using data from an internet survey in 2010, this thesis finds no significant effects of
informal parental care on employment regardless of intensity. This may be due to the
fact that care is defined very broadly. Intensive poroviders of informal parental care
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are however significantly less likely to be employed in all Nordic countries. No gender
and country differences were found in this relationship, suggesting that these countries
are very similar in this respect. There is no evidence of an endogeneity problem in the
relationship between provision of informal parental care and employment in the Nordic
countries. Thus, reversed causality should not be a problem in this relationship. This
means that the labor market decision is not influenced by a possible future care obligation.
Regarding policy recommendations, the results suggest that promoting small amounts of
informal care (up to 5 hours a month) could help release the financial pressure of the
demographic transition without reducing the tax base or harming the goal of balanced
labor force participation. Support for informal carergivers should be targeted to those
described as intensive caregivers to help them better combine work and care duties. Deci-
sion makers should consider the opportunity costs of intensive providess of informal care.
One example of opportunity costs is a reduced employment probability. Consequences
of a lower employment probability include limited job opportunities with depressed wage
rates and lower returns of work, as well as lower pension entitlements in the future. El-
dercare arrangements can therefore have profound economic, social, and psychological
implications.
The results from this thesis should be considered in the context of current and proposed
policy changes in all three countries. A recent trend affecting the care sector in Denmark
for example is that more emphasis is put on self-care and on preventive and health-
promoting activities (Schulz, 2010). It is therfore crucial to follow the developments of
eldercare policies in the three countries further to see whether they start to move in
different directions.
Since people probably first adjust their working hours before deciding to not work at all,
it would have been good to also have data on work hours to see how large the effects
are in the intensive margin, especially because working hours are more flexible in the
Nordic countries than in the rest of Europe (e.g., Brewster et al., 1997 reviewing the
literature on flexible working in Europe). Panel data to investigate whether caregivers
retire early and whether there are effects of starting and ending a care commitment would
also be helpful. There are no studies on whether there is a difference between short-term
and long-term informal caregiving in the Nordic countries. Using a sample from Spain,
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Casado Mar´ına et al. (2011) found that caregiving lasting longer than one year has
negative effects on employment while starting caregiving does not. Further, it would be
good to also investigate whether different forms of informal care, such as weekend or
weekday help, have different effects on employment. It would be interesting to look at the
total amount of care a person receives to see whether formal and informal care are used
more as substitutes or complements, and which forms of informal care are provided the
most in the Nordic countries. To my knowledge, there is no comparable study on gender
differences in the effect of informal care on labor force outcomes. Knowing whether there
are gender differences in other countries and whether there is homogeneity in this effect
between the European countries would help answer the question of whether the goal of a
balanced labor force is influenced by informal care policies.
Some Swedish and Norwegian municipalities use user fees to cover parts of their care
costs. Research in these two countries investigating the effect of these user fees in different
municipalities will give more insight into the topic. There is already a study in Sweden
from Socialstyrelsen (2005) finding that middle-income individuals who live alone refrain
more from services than their counterparts in other income classes. Among individuals
living together with someone, it is more common to refrain among those in the lower-
income class. There are no previous studies on this topic in Norway. A larger user fee in a
municipality may lead to a larger supply of informal care, pointing to a substitution effect
of formal and informal care. In addition, user fees may affect men and women differently.
Men could be more sensitive to price changes due to greater substitution possibilities
because they receive help from their partner to a larger extent than women do (Ho¨jg˚ard
and Mossler, 2001), while women may be more sensitive to price changes due to lower
incomes.
To sum up, intensive elderly care has a statistically significant negative effect on employ-
ment while there is no effect of elderly care in general in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.
This thesis does not find any gender and country differences, and there seems to be no
endogeneity problem in the Nordic countries.
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Appendix
Question on care posed to the respondents
Have you helped a family member, relative, friend, or neighbor who needs help in everyday
life due to long-term illness, disability, or old age at least once a month during the past
year (e.g., with cleaning, paperwork, personal care, or going outside)?
1. Yes, husband/wife/cohabitant/partner
2. Yes, children
3. Yes, parents/parents-in-law
4. Yes, other relative, friend or neighbor
5. No
6. If yes, how many hours a month?
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